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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Taxation-Special Taxes on
Liquor Dealers in Dry States.'
A federal statute imposes annual taxes on all dealers in alcoholic
beverages, at the following rates: retail beer $20, retail liquor $25,
wholesale beer $50, wholesale liquor $100.2 Another federal statute
imposes in addition an annual tax of $1,000 on any person carrying on
any such business contrary to the laws of any state or municipality.8
In two cases the plaintiffs, residents of the dry states of Alabama and
Georgia respectively, who had paid the taxes imposed under the first
statute,4 asked that defendant revenue officers be enjoined from col-
lecting by distraint the assessment of $1,000 on the ground that it was
not a revenue measure, but a penalty to regulate and prohibit liquor
dealing in dry territories,8 a matter beyond the control of Congress.
'The question of territorial uniformity is not treated in this note; however, it
was held in United States v. Kesterson, 8 F. Supp. 680 (N. D. OkI. 1934) that the
statute here considered did meet the constitutional requirement of uniformity. But
in Constantine v. United States,--F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) the court
expressed grave doubt, should the act be construed as imposing an excise tax, that
it meets the uniformity requirement.
'20 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928).
144 STAT. 95 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §206 (1928). This statute provided a
special excise tax of $1000 to be paid annually by every person carrying on the
business of a "brewer, distiller, wholesale liquor dealer, retail liquor dealer, whole-
sale dealer in malt liquor, retail dealer in malt liquor, or manufacturer of stills
...in any State, Territory, or District of the United States contrary to the laws
of such State, Territory, or District, or in any place therein in which carrying on
such business is prohibited by local or municipal law." The statute does not
exempt any person from any "punishment or penalty" provided by local law or
authorize them to do business contrary to local law. The act provides further that
if any person does business in a dry territory without paying the $1000 tax, he
subjects himself to a fine of as much as $1000, or maximum imprisonment of one
year, or both. The statute was passed originally in the Revenue Act of 1918
together with the Child Labor Tax and the tax on grain futures, both of which
have been declared unconstitutional. The original statute'was reanacted in 1921,
1924, and 1926; but as it now stands, it is treated as dating back to the Revenue
Act of 1918: United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278, 75
L. ed. 551 (1931).
'20 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2.
'After the passage of REvIsED STATUTES §3224, 26 U. S. C. A. §154 (1928),
prohibiting the enjoining of any tax, grounds which usually give equity jurisdic-
tion, such as resulting multiplicity of suits, or cloud on title, or unconstitution-
ality were specifically rejected. Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U. S. 118, 36 Sup. Ct. 275,
60 L. ed. 557 (1916). A "penalty" designed to regulate and prohibit, as contra-
distinguished from a "tax" designed to raise revenue, is not collectible by distraint
,proceedings, 26 U. S. C. A. §142 (1928), and may be enjoined since it does not
come within the prohibition of the injunction statute. Lipke v. Lederer, 259
U. S. 557, 42 Sup. Ct. 549, 66 L. ed. 1061 (1922) ; Miller, Restraining the Collection
of Federal Taxes and Penallies by Injunctions (1923) 71 U. PA. L. Rav. 318. It
was urged in Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. Ala. 1934) that the bill
to enjoin the so-called tax of $1000 on liquor dealers should be dismissed because
plaintiff did not come into equity with clean hands since the bill showed he was
doing business in the state of Alabama contrary to its laws; the court held that
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Held, injunctions granted.6 In a third case the defendant was con-
victed in the Northern District of Alabama for selling liquor with-
out having paid the $1,000 tax; on appeal the conviction was reversed
on the ground that the statute did not impose a tax, and that it "im-
posed a penalty as part of the enforcing machinery of the Eighteenth
Amendment, and fell with it."
' 7
the government was not in -position to raise the question, for by its statutes and
regulations it put plaintiff in a position where he was absolutely remedyless unless
the court would give him relief.
Cleveland v. Davis, 9 F. Supp. 337 (S. D. Ala. 1934) (The court held the
$1000 "tax" was a penalty, declaring: (1) that the exaction could not be a revenue
measure because "Congress would have no right to impose two taxes or a double
tax on the same business done at the same place," and the twenty-five dollars im-
posed under the first statute is the value Congress put upon the right to retail
liquor everywhere; (2) that the lump sum applicable to the different dealers alike
in the dry territories in disregard of the previous classification of the dealers
everywhere was penal in its nature; and (3) that this was an attempt to punish
for the violation of the local laws, a power which Congress does not have).
Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp. 844 (S. D. Ga. 1935) (This case went further than
the preceding case to -hold that crime was the basis of the imposition, and that the
statute imposing the "tax," which was too high to produce revenue, was uncon-
stitutional. Significance was attached to the fact that a high revenue official had
pronounced, in a radio address, that the "tax" was prohibitive; and that the
revenue department did not list this so-called tax with the liquor taxes on forms
sent to their collectors and did not try to collect it for several months after the
repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment).
'Constantine v. United States,--F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) The District
Court thought the intention and effect of the statute to impose a tax was plain
on its face; that it was valid, and that since defendant failed to pay the $1000
assessment, after having paid the twenty-five dollar tax imposed on all retail
liquor dealers, he was subject to be prosecuted and convicted under it. The
Circuit Court did not "find the statutory intent and effect so plain as that its
history and administrative interpretation may not be looked to for the light they
throw." In deciding whether the act imposed a tax or a penalty, the court laid
down the rule that "the question must be determined from a consideration of its
language, its operation and effect, and particularly the consequences which one or
the other construction will entail." In holding the imposition a penalty the court
declared it was "beyond question that its function and purpose was to penalize
and prohibit" on the ground that: (1) the language of the act requiring all types
of dealers to pay the same amount instead of, as liquor taxing acts do, "making
the exaction fit the business done ;" (2) the history of the act from its first intro-
duction Feb. 24, 1919 just prior to the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment;
(3) the fact that the imposition during the existence of the National Prohibition
Act and the Eighteenth Amendment was judicially treated as a penalty; (4) the
administrative rulings and acts of departmental officers treating it as a penalty;
and (5) the failure of Congress to reenact the statute after the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment. The court concluded that "it was enacted as a penalty,
not a tax, and that it may not now, the Amendment which authorized it repealed,
be enforced as a penalty."
It was held in United States v. La Franca, 282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278,
75 L. ed. 551 (1931) that, although the original statute was reenacted in 1921,
1924, and 1926, the $1000 tax was imposed 'by an act in force prior to the National
Prohibition Act and the Eighteenth Amendment. Accepting this as the law,
quaere as to whether the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment repealed a statute
passed prior to said Amendment? It seems that the better view is that the statute
was passed originally as a regulatory or prohibitory measure without constitutional
authority; that it Nvas subsequently validated by the Eighteenth Amendment giving
Congress the authority to regulate intrastate liquor traffic, and that by the repeal
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It may be difficult to determine whether a statute is a regulatory
or a revenue measure, yet the consequences of the distinction are mate-
rial "when one sovereign can impose a tax only, while the power of reg-
ulation rests in another." s A tax of ten cents a pound on butter sub-
stitutes designed to protect the dairy interests,0 a tax of $300 a pound
on the manufacture of opium designed to restrict its manufacture, 10
and a registration tax of one dollar on dispensers of dope for the pur-
pose of regulating its sale," notwithstanding their regulatory charac-
ter, were held to be taxes 'because "on their face" they were acts to
raise revenue. The courts laid down the rule that they could not go be-
yond the face of the act to determine the motive or purpose of Congress.
This trend toward a system of regulation through the taxing power in
derogation of state rights was checked in the Child Labor Tax Case.'2
It was there held that a "tax" of ten per cent on the net profits of any-
of the Eighteenth Amendment the act reverted to its original status and is there-
fore again unconstitutional.
' Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 38, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922). See Note (1926) 10 MixN. L. REv. 511.9 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. ed. 78 (1904)
(There was a tax of only one-fourth of one cent on the plain oleomargarine while
the tax on the colored was ten cents a pound. It was well known that this was a
regulatory measure but the court confined itself to the "face of the act" to hold
it a tax). See Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Taxing Clause of
the Constitution (1920) 4 MixN. L. Rav. 247.
"Lee Mow Lin v. United States, 250 Fed. 694 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918) (The
statute provided that a "tax of $300 per pound shall be levied and collected upon all
opium manufactured in the United States for smoking purposes ... ." This court
followed the test set up in the McCray Case, and stated at page 696, "The law on
its face is a law imposing a tax for revenue purposes. The tax imposed of $300
a pound on all opium manufactured for smoking purposes may be so high as to
defeat the purpose of raising revenue, but the power to tax, as has been said, is
the -power to destroy.")
2 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, 39 Sup. Ct. 214, 63 L. ed. 493 (1919)
(The court went further in this case than in the previous cases to uphold a detailed
system of regulation and control of the drug traffic under 38 STAT. 785 (1914),
wherein the court practically admitted the moral purpose of the act, but upheld
the government's argument that, on its face, its main purpose was revenue, and
since Congress had power to tax, the judiciary would not look beyond the statute.
The court was of the opinion that the regulatory provisions of the law could not
be said to have no reasonable relation to the collection of the revenue although the
tax amounted to only one dollar).
"Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed. 817
(1922) (The court found here that the statute did not impose a tax with only an
incidental restraint and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve, but that
it attempted to regulate by a so-called tax. Chief Justice Taft was fearful of the
invasion of state rights: "Grant the validity of the law, and all that Congress
would have to do hereafter in seeking to take over to its control any one of the
great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction over which is reserved
to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the federal Constitution, would be to
enact a detailed regulation of the subject and enforce it with a so-called 'tax' upon
departures from it. To give such magic to the word tax would be to break down
all constitutional limitations of the power of Congress and completely wipe out
the sovereignty of the states." See also Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct.
453, 66 L. ed. 822 (1922).
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one who knowingly' 3 employed child labor 14 in certain businesses was
in fact a penalty to prohibit employment of children, and not a tax for
revenue. 15 The court did not purport to reject the test applied in the
earlier cases, but did apply it and found on the face of the act fea-
tures which marked it as a regulatory rather than a revenue measure.
Yet the Child Labor Tax Case seems inharmonious with the prior deci-
sions although expressly' 6 it does not overrule them.17
What, then, is the status of the $1,000 liquor tax involved in the
principal cases? The special taxes upon the occupation of liquor deal-
ers, which were enacted prior to the Eighteenth Amendment, remained
in force' s but took on a "new character and status under the Eighteenth
Amendment;" 19 they were said to be no longer exactions for rev-
enue purposes. They became "penalties or fines imposed for criminal
misconduct." 20  The $1,000 assessment was included in the assessment
on the defendants in Thome v. Lync, 21 and it was adjudged a penalty on
the ground that where an exaction is made by governmental authority
upon an occupation which is expressly prohibited as criminal 'by the
"The court stressed the element of scienter, that the employer must know that
the child is under age and that he is departing from the prescribed course, else he
is not subject to the assessment. The court added, "Scienters are associated with
penalties, not -with taxes."
"The amount was not to be proportioned in any degree to the extent or fre-
quency of the departures, but was, as the court stated at page 36, "to be paid by
the employer in full measure whether he employs five hundred children for a year,
or employs only one for a day."
I The court stated that this case could not be distinguished from Hammer v.
Daggenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918) which held un-
constitutional the effort of Congress to regulate the hours of labor of children by
means of a prohibition against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary
commercial commodities which they helped to produce. See Powell, Child Labor,
Congress, and the Constitution (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 61.
"I Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 40-43, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922) (The court discussed and distinguished the preceding cases).
Iz It seems that the court could very well have followed the previous cases to
sustain the Child Labor Tax, but it seems to have recognized that Congress was
encroaching too much upon the reserved police power of the states and found
features on the face of the act sufficient to distinguish this act from those pre-
viously sustained and which were almost as far reaching, and passed with the
same regulatory intent. See Note (1922) 71 U. PA. L. REy. 54.
u La Franca v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 269 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
" Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921).
0 La Franca v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 269, 270 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930).
'269 Fed. 995, 1007 (D. Minn. 1921). Assessment against one defendant:
1. Taxes on retail liquor dealer, R. S. §3224 ........................... $ 25.00
2. Above tax doubled by §35 of Nat. Prohibition Act .................... 25.00
3. Penalty of 25% on (1) and (2) under R. S. §3176 ................... 12.50
4. Special tax on liquor dealer under 26 U. S. C. A. §206 ................ 1,000.00
5. Above tax doubled by §35 of Nat. Prohibition Act ................... 1,000.00
6. Penalty of 25% on (4) and (5) under R. S. §3176 ................... 500.00
7. Special penalty provided by §35 of Nat. Prohi. Act ................. 500.00
$3,062.50
8. 5% penalty under R. S. §3186 ....................................... $ 153.13
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same governmental authority, the exaction is a penalty unless it is
clearly shown to be made for revenue purposes.2 2 Section 35 of the
National Prohibition Act 23 doubled the tax on the preexisting dealer's
licenses. In reference to that section, the Supreme Court in United
States v. La Franca24 declared:
"This, in reality, is but to say that a person who makes an illegal sale
shall be liable to pay a 'tax' in double the amount of the tax imposed
by preexisting law for making a legal sale, which existing law makes it
impossible to make.. . the exaction here involved is not a true tax, but
a penalty involving the idea of punishment for infraction of the law."
The imposition was held a penalty, not because it was doubled, but be-
cause the occupation taxed had become unlawful.25 Although the statute
was here considered in connection with the National Prohibition Act,
it seems the same thing may be said of the $1,000 "tax" standing alone
following the adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment because the
sole basis of the assessment is illegality,-the carrying on of a liquor
business in violation of the law of a state or municipality. It would
seem that the exaction is not a true tax but remains "a penalty involving
the idea of punishment for infraction of the law" of dry territories.
The La Franca Case expressly2 6 does not overrule the decision in
United States v. One Ford Coupe Autonwbile,27 which held that the
basic production tax on liquor did not become a penalty under the
Eighteenth Amendment because the tax had always been applied to
'Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921).
27 U. S. C. A. §52 (1928).
282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278, 75 L. ed. 551 (1931) (Civil suit by the
United States to recover for non-payment of the double taxes, including the taxes
levied by both statutes considered in the principal cases of this note and the
additional penalty of $500 incurred 'by defendant's liquor sale in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. Defendant pleaded in bar his prior conviction in a
criminal prosecution for the same illegal sales. Held, the "tax" clearly involved
the idea of punishment for infraction of law; the suit for these penalties, not-
withstanding it was civil in form, amounted to a second punishment for the same
acts, and the first prosecution barred the second action).
Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995 (D. Minn. 1921).
2282 U. S. 568, 572, 51 Sup. Ct. 278, 75 L. ed. 551 (1931).
1272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 278, 71 L. ed. 279 (1926) (This decision was to
the effect that the law taxing liquor was not in conflict with the law prohibiting its
manufacture because the tax applies to the manufacture the same whether it was
legally or illegally made. The court, at page 328, declared, "A tax on intoxicating
liquors does not cease to be such because the sovereign has declared that none
shall be manufactured, and because the main purpose in retaining the tax is to
make law-breaking less profitable. . . .What was sought to be enforced and held
to be a penalty in Lipke v. Lederer ...was the so-called double tax. Here we are
dealing with the basic production tax.") Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557, 42 Sup.
Ct. 549, 66 L. ed. 1061 (1922), referred to in the preceding case, held that the
special license taxes doubled by §35 of the National Prohibition Act had become
penal in their nature and must be treated as penalties although designated as taxes.
The government was enjoined from collecting these doubled taxes by distraint on
the ground that they were penalties and not within the scope of the statute prevent-
ing the enjoining of any taxes.
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all liquor whether manufactured legally or illegally; otherwise any
liquor unlawfully manufactured would be exempt from the tax.
No question is raised as to the validity of the tax imposed by the
statute levying taxes on alt dealers in alcoholic beverages, 28 because it
was early established by the License Tax Cases 9 that a tax applicable
everywhere over the country applied to the sale of liquor in the dry as
well as the wet states; naturally illegal sales should not be exempt from
taxation. The payment of this tax does not authorize the dealing in
liquor but simply privileges the licensee from penal interference by the
federal government during the period covered by the so-called license.30
The $1,000 tax is sui generis,-the sole basis of the imposition being the
violation of local laws, usually criminal offenses. It would seem the
intention to derive revenue from taxes on criminal offenses as such
should not be imputed to Congress.31
It may not be inferred solely from the heavy burden of a tax that
a prohibition was intended;32 but there is an indefinite limit beyond
which a so-called tax ripens into a penalty, dependent upon the cir-
cumstances in the individual statute.3 3 The taxes imposed by the first
20 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2.
72 U. S. 462, 18 L. ed. 497 (1866) (13 STAT. 248 (1864) provided that no
person should retail liquor without first obtaining a license from -the United States.
The statute is vastly different from the $1000 tax statute in question which is
dependent upon crime for its application).
' North Carolina -provides by statute, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931)
§3379 (1), that proof of possession of a federal license for the sale of liquors is
prina facie evidence of a violation of the state law prohibiting possession of in-
toxicating liquors for purpose of sale.
"Thome v. Lynch, 269 Fed. 995, 1003 (D. Minn. 1921). It would seem that
the imposition of a so-called tax upon any one who commits a specified criminal
offence has as its purpose punishment for the commission of the crime. It should
not matter that the offense be against the laws of a state instead of the laws of
the federal govermnt since the statute has adopted the "criteria of wrongdoing."
'Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475, 46 Sup. Ct. 165, 70 L. ed. 365 (1926) (In
declaring that the federal "tax" of twenty cents per bushel on the dealing in
grain "futures" was unconstitutional because regulatory, the court recognized that
it could not infer prohibition solely from the heavy burden of the exaction.
Nevertheless, in determining that the so-called tax was a penalty, the court at-
tached significance to the fact that there would be a total destruction by the tax
of the thing taxed); cf. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 54 Sup. Ct. 599, 78
L. ed. 1109 (1934) ; Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 55 Sup. Ct. 333 (1935).
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 38, 42 Sup. Ct. 449, 66 L. ed.
817 (1922) ("Taxes are occasionally imposed in the discretion of the legislature
on proper subjects with the primary motive of obtaining revenue from them, and
with the incidental motive of discouraging them -by making their continuance
onerous. They do not lose their character as taxes because of the incidental
motive. But there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty,
with the characteristics of regulation and punishment. Such is the case in the
law before us. Although Congriss does not invalidate the contract of employment,
or expressly declare that the employment within the mentioned ages is illegal, it
does exhibit its intent practically to achieve the latter result by adopting the
criteria of wrongdoing, and imposing its principal consequence on those who
transgress its standard.")
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statute3 4 are graduated as to the several dealers and are not prohibitive.
The so-called tax under the second statute3 5 is not graduated, but ap-
plies alike to the smallest retailer of beer in the tiny hamlet and to the
largest wholesaler of liquor with the- whole state as his territory; and
it is, for most retailers at least, absolutely prohibitive. Furthermore
the taxes on the conduct of the business in violation of local laws are
not increased proportionately. The retail beer dealer has to pay fifty
times as much "tax" as is imposed where his occupation is lawful;
while the wholesale liquor dealer has to pay only ten times his original
tax. The heaviest burden falls upon the dealer whom Congress con-
sidered the least able to pay under the first statute.8 6 The great dis-
parity between the tax on legal business and the further sum imposed
upon illegal business would seem to show the latter to be penal in its
nature although designated a "tax."'3 7 It seems from the language of
20 STAr. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra niote 2.
=44 STAT. 95 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §206 (1928), spra note 3.
3820 STAT. 333, 342 (1879), 26 U. S. C. A. §205 (1928), supra note 2. As stated
in the opening paragraph of this note, Congress placed different valuations on the
right to engage in the liquor business; the -wholesale liquor dealer -was required to
pay fivd times as much for his license as the retail beer dealer paid for his. If
Congress intended the levy under the second statute to be a tax, it seems that it
would have again recognized the difference in the scope of the several occupations.
Considering the two statutes together, the imposition of a lump sum in the second
clearly imports that it was designed to penalize the person who conducted his
business unlawfully.
'Helwig v. United States, 188 U. S. 605, 23 Sup. Ct. 427, 47 L. ed. 614 (1903),
This case involved an act imposing an additional "tax" equal to two per cent of
the appraised value of imported merchandise for each one per cent that such value
exceeded the valuation declared in the entry. The court, in holding that such an
imposition was a penalty and not a tax, said at page 613: "Although the sum
imposed by undervaluation may be simply described as a 'further sum' or an
'additional duty,' if it is yet so enormously in excess of the greatest amount of
regular duty ever imposed upon an article of the same nature, and it is imposed by
reason of the action of the importer, such facts clearly show it is a penalty in its
intrinsic nature, but describing it as a 'further sum' or 'additional duty,' wilt not
work a statutory alteration of the nature of the imposition, and it will be regarded
as a penalty when by its very nature it is a penalty. It is impossible, judging
simply from its language, to hold the provision to be other than penal in its
nature."
It is submitted that the statement just quoted is applicable to the $1000 liquor
tax in several respects, namely: this tax is in effect an "additional sum" imposed
upon dealers in dry states; it is "enormously in excess" of that imposed by the
first statute everywhere over the country; it is imposed "by reason of the action
of the" dealer in violating the local laws; and, in considering the language of
the tvo liquor tax statutes together, the $1000 imposition is "penal in its nature."
It is significant, though a court might not take notice of it, since it does not
so appear "on its face," that the $1000 tax was added in 1919 after Congress had
passed the Reed Amendment, 39 STAT. 1069 (1917), which made it a federal
offense to transport liquor into dry states, and after it had submitted the
Eighteenth Amendment for ratification.
The statute imposing the $1000 "tax" was in effect for such a short time before
Congress was authorized by the Eighteenth Amendment to regulate the intrastate
liquor traffic that the constitutionality of the act had not been tested until recently
following the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The courts in Constantine v.
United States,-F. (2d)-(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) and Green v. Page, 9 F. Supp.
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the act that this additional duty was laid for the purpose of enabling
Congress to regulate by taxes the intrastate liquor traffic, a power which
was withdrawn by the Twenty-first Amendment.
THroMAs H. LEATii.
Contracts-Adoption of Present and Future Laws therein.
In a mortgage the mortgagor declared "his assent to the passing of a
decree by the Circuit Court of Baltimore City . . . for a sale of the
property herein mortgaged in accordance with sections 720 to 723
inclusive of chapter 123 of the laws of Maryland passed at the January
session of 1898, or any amendments or additions thereto".' The mort-
gagee assigned to the plaintiff part of the mortgage debt, but less than a
one-fourth interest therein. Thereafter the legislature passed section
720A, 2 amending section 720 to the effect that during the emergency
period holders of less than a one-fourth interest in mortgage debts should
not have recourse to the summary remedies given under section 720.
Upon subsequent default by the mortgagor, the plaintiff petitioned for
relief under section 720, alleging that section 720A was unconstitu-
tional, as impairing his contract rights and violating the equal protec-
tion clause. The judgment of the trial court, upholding both contentions
of the plaintiff, was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals on the
basis of impairment of contract only. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, judgment was reversed on the theory that the
amendment did not impair the plaintiff's contract rights.8
The Maryland Court of Appeals took the position that assent of the
mortgagor to a decree as provided by section 720 "or any amendments
or additions thereto", did not amount to an agreement that the proceed-
ings should be governed by "future amendments effective before appli-
cation for the decree", but that the intention of the parties "embraced
only such amendments as had been made prior to the execution of the
mortgage". After quoting that argument, Justice McReynolds, for the
United States Supreme court, said, "Prior to the mortgage there had
been no such amendments, and it cannot be correctly said that the 'inten-
tion of the parties embraced only such amendments as had been made
prior to the execution of the mortgage'. On the contrary the words
844 (S. D. Ga. 1935) hold directly that the statute is a regulatory measure and
unconstitutional.
I Md. Laws 1898, c. 123, §720 (providing that where the mortgagor declared
his assent to such decree, upon the petition of the mortgagee or his assigns to
the named court, that court could issue such decree of sale and prescribe terms
for same).
'Md. Laws 1933, c. 56, §1.
' United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 168,
79 L. Ed. 191 (1934).
